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PROTECTING THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT:
WILL A PROTOCOL BE ENOUGH?
Elaine F. Foreman*
The thick Antarctic ice cap is an invaluable treasury of the Earth's past, of its
geological and ecological history. Significantly, the Antarctic has become the
world's first nuclear-free zone and the first-ever territory fully open for interna-
tional research programmes. . . . Our grandchildren will never forgive us if we
fail to preserve this phenomenal ecological system.'
Antarctica plays an essential role in maintaining the Earth's delicate environ-
mental balance. [S]tudies of this vast region will help us to understand more
fully the processes that sustain life around the globe. The United States is com-
mitted to preserving this unique natural laboratory and invites all nations to join
us in this effort.2
INTRODUCTION
Amidst growing concern over the Antarctic environment, 3 represent-
atives of the forty nations4 that are parties to the Antarctic Treaty'
* J.D. Candidate 1993, Washington College of Law, the American Unviersity.
1. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, proposal at the Moscow Forum on Environment and De-
velopment for Survival (Jan., 1990), cited in Mohamed Haron, The Ability of the
Antarctic Treaty System to Adapt to External Challenges, in THE ANTARCTIC
TREATY SYSTEM IN WORLD POLITICS 299, 304 (Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl & Willy Ps-
treng eds., 1991).
2. President George Bush, Annual message to winter-overs at United States facili-
ties in Antarctica (1989), cited in Brenda Sue Thornton & Tom Marshall, The Great
Cold Rush in Antarctica, ENVTL. L.F., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 7.
3. See James N. Barnes, Protection of the Environment in Antarctica: Are Present
Regimes Enough?, in THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM IN WORLD POLITICS 186, 216
(Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl & Willy Pstreng eds., 1991) [hereinafter Barnes, Protection
of the Environment] (observing that the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings are
increasingly focused on environmental issues and noting that at recent meetings, more
than half of the delegates' time was spent on environmental issues); S.K.N. BLAY ET.
AL., ANTARCTICA AFrTER 1991: THE LEGAL AND POLICY OPTIONS 25, 25 (University of
Tasmania Faculty of Law ed., 1989) [hereinafter BLAY, ANTARCTICA AvrER 19911
(stating that Antarctica is crucial for several reasons, including its natural features, its
role as a global climate regulator, and its extremely fragile ecosystem); Malcom W.
Browne, Broad Effort Underway to Track Ozone Hole's Effects, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
1992, at Cl (explaining that the hole in the ozone layer has led to increases in ultravio-
let radiation which may put Antarctic plants and animals at risk). Current research is
expected to show how ecosystems respond to increases in ultraviolet radiation. Id.
4. See Final Report of the Eleventh Antarctic Treaty Special Consultative Meet-
ing, addendum to Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Spe-
cial Consultative Meeting, 27th Sess., ATSCM/2/3/2, 30 I.L.M. 1455 (1991) [herein-
after Final Report of the Eleventh Consultative Meeting] (listing the parties to the
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met in Madrid to develop a comprehensive plan to protect it.6 The re-
sult was a protocol which will work in connection with the Antarctic
Treaty.7
The Antarctic environment is important, 8 not only to its indigenous
species, 9 but also as a monitoring zone for global pollution."0 In Ant-
arctica, scientists have found simple ecosystems11 which can be used as
Antarctic Treaty). The parties to this treaty are Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Cuba,
Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India,
Italy, Japan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Romania,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Uruguay. Id.
5. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 [hereinaf-
ter Treaty].
6. See Antarctica Ecological Pact Signed, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5, 1991, at C2 (an-
nouncing that the Protocol, which was the result of two years of negotiations, was
signed on October 4, 1991).
7. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Special Consulta-
tive Meeting, 27th Sess., ATSCM/2/3/2, 30 I.L.M. 1455 (1991) [hereinafter Proto-
col]. The Protocol supplements, but does not supersede the Treaty. Id. art, 4.
8. See Best of 1991: Environment, TIME, Jan. 6, 1992, at 68 (naming the signing of
the Protocol as the number one environmental news story of 1991); Bill Dietrich, Ice
Odyssey to Unlock Global Secrets, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 2, 1991, at Dl (characteriz-
ing Antarctica as important due to its influence on global weather patterns).
9. See Barnes, Protection of the Environment, supra note 3 at 205 (describing Ant-
arctica as the world's largest wildlife sanctuary). Antarctica is home to seven species of
penguins and six species of seals. Id. Fifteen species of whales use the oceans surround-
ing Antarctica as summer feeding grounds. Id. See also Abdul Koroma, Safeguarding
the Interests of Mankind in the Use of Antarctica, in ANTARCTIC CHALLENGE III:
CONFLICTING INTERESTS, COOPERATION, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, AND Eco-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT 243, 243-44 (Riidiger Wolfrum ed., 1988) [hereinafter Koroma]
(stating that the Antarctic krill, a shrimp-like crustacean, is central to the Antarctic
ecosystem, and that over-harvesting of krill could have an adverse effect on Antarctic
fish and birds).
10. See John A. Heap & Martin W. Holdgate, The Antarctic Treaty System as an
Environmental Mechanism - An Approach to Environmental Issues, in ANTARCTIC
TREATY SYSTEM: AN ASSESSMENT 195, 199 (Polar Research Board ed., 1986) [herein-
after Heap & Holdgate] (asserting that the relatively pure Antarctic environment pro-
vides research opportunities which are not available anywhere else on the planet); see
also James N. Barnes, Legal Aspects of Environmental Protection in Antarctica, in
THE ANTARCTIC LEGAL REGIME 241, 241 (Christopher C. Joyner & Sudhir K. Chopra
eds., 1988) (listing Antarctica's importance as a global monitoring zone among the
reasons for a global consensus supporting protection of the Antarctic environment);
Mike Woods, Antarctica: The Science Continent of the World, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Jan.
12, 1992, (stating that, in 1991, the hole in the ozone layer was reported to be the
worst in thirteen years, and that Antarctica has become a crucial research site for
examining atmospheric developments).
11. 4 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 358 (15th ed. 1988) (defining ecosys-
tem). The term ecosystem refers to living organisms, their physical environment, and
the interaction of the two in a particular area. Id. Ecosystems provide a method of




models to chart the future of more complex systems. 2 Experts suggest
that the Antarctic krill population could provide an important source of
protein to countries fraught with famine and drought. 13 The potential
for increased exploitation of Antarctic resources has also piqued the
interest and involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Accordingly, Antarctica is no longer of interest solely to explorers and
scientists. Outside interests, including the United Nations and environ-
mental groups, have urged the preservation of Antarctica for the heri-
tage of mankind. 5
This Comment addresses the need for an enforceable system to pro-
tect the Antarctic environment, with specific analysis of the October 4,
1991 Protocol. Section I of the Comment provides an historical per-
spective of Antarctica in general and of the Antarctic Treaty system in
particular. This section includes a discussion of sovereignty issues,
which are important to Antarctica for at least two reasons. First, if a
nation wishes to exert judicial authority over Antarctica on the basis of
territorial sovereignty, the boundaries of the claim must be clearly
drawn. Second, if mineral or other resource exploitation is permitted,
extraction in disputed territories could lead to international conflicts.
Section II introduces and evaluates previous efforts to protect the
Antarctic environment. Section III sets forth the provisions of the Pro-
tocol. Finally, Section IV analyzes the enforceability of the Protocol.
By analyzing the Protocol in light of earlier diplomatic efforts to pro-
tect the Antarctic environment, this Comment addresses the prospects
for substantive regulation of the Antarctic environment. Because the
Protocol will be unenforceable within the Antarctic Treaty system, this
Comment recommends that administration of the continent be turned
over to the United Nations.
12. See Barnes, Protection of the Environment. supra note 3, at 212 (suggesting
that the simple ecosystems which have been preserved by the Antarctic ice cap may
improve our understanding of human evolution and provide clues to our development).
13. See Koroma, supra note 9, at 243-44 (suggesting that 400,000 tons of krill
could be harvested annually to feed those in famine-stricken countries without jeopard-
izing the Antarctic ecosystem).
14. See generally, Barnes, Protection of the Environment, supra note 3, at 186-89
(discussing the implications to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) of the ratifica-
tion of the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities).
The NGOs concerned with the protection of the Antarctic environment are primarily
international environmental groups. Id.
15. See PHILIP W. QUIGG, A POLE APART: THE EMERGING ISSUE OF ANTARCTICA
164-82 (1983) [hereinafter QUIGG] (stating that conservationists have urged that the
Antarctic environment be protected by designating it a world preserve which is free
from mineral exploitation).
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I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. GENERAL HISTORY OF ANTARCTICA
1. Discovery and Early Claims
The continent of Antarctica 6 is actually a group of islands surround-
ing the South Pole.17 The Antarctic land mass 18 is largely covered by
ice. 19 In 1820, Captain Palmer of the United States claimed to have
sighted the Antarctic continent.2 0 The Soviet Union later disputed the
primacy of this claim.2' Due to the impenetrability of the ice fields
surrounding Antarctica, explorers did not reach the continent itself un-
til the late eighteenth century.22 The advent of the sealing industry in
the 1820s brought increased commercial activity to the Antarctic re-
gion.2 3 When the sealing industry died out in the 1830s, 24 so did much
of the interest in Antarctic exploration. 5 The advent of the whaling
industry in the late nineteenth century, however, reestablished the eco-
nomic importance of Antarctica.26
16. See Treaty, supra note 5, art. VI (describing Antarctica as the area south of
60" South Latitude).
17. Luis H. MERICQ, ANTARCTICA: CHILE'S CLAIM 12 (1987) [hereinafter
MERICQ].
18. See MERICQ, supra note 17 (stating that the Antarctic continent has a surface
area of approximately 5.6 million square miles).
19. MERICQ, supra note 17 at 4. See also DEBORAH SHAPLEY, THE SEVENTH CON-
TINENT: ANTARCTICA IN A RESOURCE AGE at 1 (1985), [hereinafter SHAPLEYJ (con-
tending that parts of the continent are below sea level due to the immense weight of the
Antarctic ice cap).
20. See MERICQ, supra note 17, at 8 (explaining that Palmer's motives were both
economic and geopolitical). When Palmer returned to the area in 1821, he encountered
a Russian ship. Id. The captain, von Bellingshausen, acknowledged the primacy of
Palmer's claim. Id.
21. MERICQ, supra note 17, at 8. Russia based the primacy of its claim on the
1821 voyage of Captain von Bellingshausen. Id.
22. V.E. Fuchs, Antarctica: Its History and Development, in ANTARCTIC RE-
SOURCES POLICY 13, 13 (Francisco 0. Vicufia ed., 1983). During the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, explorers were mainly pursuing sealing and whaling ventures. Id.
See generally MERICQ, supra note 17, at 4-6 (describing the voyages of sixteenth cen-
tury explorers in the Antarctic region).
23. See SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at 7-8 (discussing British, Norwegian, and Amer-
ican sealing activities in the area north of 60' South Latitude during the 1820s).
24. SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at 7-8.
25. SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at 8-9 (stating that although most of the exploration
ceased, Britain, the United States, and France conducted several voyages to Antarctica
in the mid-nineteenth century for exploratory purposes).
26. SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at 9 (explaining that the whaling industry in
Antarctic waters produced ten times more whale oil than the rest of the world).
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The period from 1894 to 1941 has been termed Antarctica's "heroic
age." 27 During this time nations focused attention on Antarctica for
geopolitical rather than economic reasons.2 8 By 1939, five countries29
had asserted territorial sovereignty over portions of Antarctica on the
basis of discovery. 0 In the early 1940s, Argentina and Chile also made
claims of territorial sovereignty.3' The claimants created the territorial
boundaries using the Arctic sector theory as a model.3 2 The sector the-
ory, however, divides the land along longitudinal lines.3 3 The sector the-
ory is less feasible when applied to Antarctica than when applied to the
Arctic because Antarctica has no convenient outer boundary. 
3
27. See FRANK G. KLOTZ, AMERICA ON THE ICE: ANTARCTIC PoucY ISSUES at
xxiii-xxvi (1990) [hereinafter KLOTZ] (chronicling the expeditions of the Antarctic
explorers).
28. See SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at 9-14 (explaining that interest in the explora-
tion of Antarctica increased because it was the last unchartered and unclaimed land on
earth).
29. Rolph Trolle-Anderson, The Antarctic Scene: Legal and Political Facts. in THE
ANTARCTIC TREATY REGIME: LAW, ENVIRONMENT, AND RESOURCES 57, 57 (Gillian D.
Triggs ed., 1987) [hereinafter Trolle-Anderson]. The five countries are the United
Kingdom, New Zealand, France, Australia and Norway. Id.
30. F.M. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITIcS 6-7 (1982) [hereinafter Au-
BURN]. The United Kingdom claims that their Letters Patent of 1908 and 1917 estab-
lish their rights to Antarctica, based on earlier explorations and discoveries. These
rights, over what is now the Antarctic Territory, were formally set forth at the Imperial
Conference of 1926. Id. France bases its claim to Ad6lie Land on the 1840 voyage of
Dumont d'Urville. Id. Ad6lie Land was excluded from the Australian sector in 1933.
Id. Norway founds its claim to Queen Maud Land upon Amundsen's explorations. Id.
See also J.R. Rowland, The Treaty Regime and the Politics of the Consultative Par-
ties, in THE ANTARCTIC LEGAL REGIME 11, 22-23 (Christopher C. Joyner and Sudhir
K. Chopra eds., 1988) (reasoning that Norway formally asserted its claim in 1939 due
to fears of German preemption). New Zealand bases its claim on the fact that Great
Britain placed the Ross Ice Shelf under its administration in 1923. KLOTZ, supra note
27, at xxiv. Additionally, New Zealand carried out some exploration, and therefore
bases its claim on both discovery and exploration. JEFFREY D. MYHRE, THE
ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM: POLITIcS, LAW, AND DIPLOMACY 14 (1986) [hereinafter
MYHRE].
31. KLOTZ, supra note 27, at xxiv. Chile made its claim to the majority of the
Antarctic peninsula in 1940. Id. Argentina proclaimed its right to territory in the pe-
ninsular region in 1940. Id. at xxv. Both Chile and Argentina base their claims on four
factors: (1) succession to Spanish rights; (2) geographical proximity; (3) geological af-
finity; and (4) occupation of a weather station since 1904. MYHRE, supra note 30 at 13.
32. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 17-23 (describing the means by which the Arc-
tic area was divided up into pie-shaped wedges, using the Arctic Circle as the outer
boundary). Countries with land bordering the polar circle had claims from that point to
the North Pole. Id. at 17.
33. AUBURN, supra note 30 at 17.
34. See AUBURN, supra note 30 at 24 (explaining that if the south polar circle were
used as the boundary, there would be no sectors, and that if 40" were used, only Ar-
gentina and Chile would have claims); see also MYHRE, supra note 30, at 12 (setting
forth the longitudinal boundaries of the current claims).
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In addition to being based on different theories of sovereignty,35 the
territorial claims of Great Britain, Chile, and Argentina are a subject
of dispute because Chile and Argentina have attempted to assert sover-
eignty over areas claimed by Great Britain .3  The territorial issue is
complicated because only five countries" recognize each other's claims.
The conflict between claims of territorial sovereignty was a major issue
during the formulation of the Antarctic Treaty,38 and remains so today.
2. The Issue of Antarctic Sovereignty
The requirements for the establishment of sovereignty are fact spe-
cific. " According to the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland" there are
fewer sovereignty requirements for remote, inaccessible areas than for
populous areas.41 Courts have, however, held that acts of discovery
35. See infra notes 39-43 (explaining the discovery theory of sovereignty, on which
the United Kingdom, New Zealand, France, Australia, and Norway base their
Antarctic claims). See also infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (explaining that
Chile and Argentina base their claims on proximity).
36. See Peter J. Beck, The Antarctic Resources Conventions Implemented: Conse-
quences for the Sovereignty Issue, in THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM IN WORLD
POLITICS 229, 231-32 (Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl & Willy )streng eds., 1991) [hereinaf-
ter Beck] (stating that Argentina, Britain, and Chile have had numerous clashes over
their overlapping claims, including an incident in which Argentinean soldiers fired at
British personnel to prevent them from rebuilding a base station).
37. See Gillian D. Triggs, Introduction to The Antarctic Treaty Regime: Legal
Issues, in THE ANTARCTIC TREATY REGIME: LAW, ENVIRONMENT, AND RESOURCES 51,
52 (Gillian D. Triggs ed., 1987) (listing the five countries as Australia, New Zealand,
Norway, France, and the United Kingdom). These countries recognize each other's
claims because they are based on similar theories, and because the claimed areas do
not overlap. Id.
38. See infra notes 96-100 (explaining how the parties dealt with the sovereignty
issue). In the end, the Antarctic Treaty was written to maintain the status quo on the
sovereignty issue. Infra note 96.
39. AUBURN, supra note 30, at 5.
40. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 53 (Apr. 5).
41. Id. at 27-30. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland settled a territorial dispute
between Denmark and Norway. Id. Denmark based its claim of sovereignty on the fact
that by the end of the eighteenth century Danes had settled the western part of Green-
land and had passed legislation regarding its administration. Id. Moreover, by the end
of the eighteenth century, Denmark had established a trade monopoly in the area. Id.
at 29. Thus, the main thrust of Denmark's argument was that its control over Green-
land had been continuous over a long period of time. Id. at 31-34.
Norway countered the Danish argument by contending that it had originally colo-
nized Greenland in the eleventh century, although these original settlements were gone
by the fifteenth century. Id. at 27. Further, Norway argued, the area it intended to
occupy in the twentieth century was terra nullius because it was unoccupied. Id. at 41.
The court held for Denmark and based its findings on the prolonged continual con-
trol which Denmark had exercised over the eastern part of Greenland. Id. at 54. This
control was held to extend to all of Greenland due to its inaccessibility and severe
climate. Id. at 55.
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alone are not a basis of territorial sovereignty.' 2 Discovery conveys an
inchoate title which must be completed within a reasonable time by
occupation.,"
If circumstances arise which make it necessary to decide the sover-
eignty of a particular area in Antarctica, those countries claiming sov-
ereignty on the basis of discovery 4 would have to show that their title
by discovery had been completed by occupation." This might be a diffi-
cult burden to meet, considering that when the boundaries of the
Antarctic territories were established between 1908 and 1943, there
was no evidence of permanent settlement on the continent.4 7 It is possi-
ble, however, that by relying on the Legal Status of Eastern Green-
land,48 those nations using discovery as a basis for jurisdiction would be
able to use the extreme conditions in Antarctica as a reason for not
occupying the continent sooner.4 Chile and Argentina would object to
these claims and their underlying bases.50
42. See, e.g., Island of Palmas (Netherlands v. United States), II R.I.A.A. 829
(1928) (holding that because the Netherlands had administered activities on the Island
of Palmas for more than two centuries, it had effectively established a stronger claim of
sovereignty than the United States). The United States based its claim on inheritance
due to Spain's cessation of rights to the island. The Spanish rights, the United States
argued, were firmly rooted in discovery. Id. at 843-44.
43. Id. at 846. See GILLIAN D. TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AUSTRALIAN
SOVEREIGNTY IN ANTARCTICA 29, 29 (1986) [hereinafter TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL
LAW] (remarking that it is unclear how much time a country has to perfect its incho-
ate title).
44. Supra notes 29 & 30 and accompanying text.
45. See TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 43, at 4-6 (explaining that dis-
covery alone is not enough to acquire title, but rather there must also be effective occu-
pation and adequate control over the territory).
46. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 17 (noting the period of boundary establish-
ment in Antarctica).
47. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 17 (explaining that it would be difficult to
objectively show effective occupation because the claimants had not indicated their in-
tention to exercise control over the area).
48. See supra notes 40 & 41 and accompanying text (outlining the holding of the
case).
49. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (explaining that although discov-
ery conveys an inchoate title which must be completed by occupation, effective occupa-
tion requires a lesser showing of control for remote, inaccessible areas). Antarctica is
both remote and inaccessible because the continent is surrounded by drifting icebergs
and only 2.5 percent of its land is ice-free. David J. Drewry, The Antarctic Physical
Environment, in THE ANTARCTIC TREATY REGIME: LAW ENVIRONMENT AND RE-
SOURCES 6, 7 (Gillian D. Triggs ed., 1987).
50. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (explaining that the claims of
Chile and Argentina overlap with the British claims); Richard Falk, The Antarctic
Treaty System: Are There Viable Alternatives?, in THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTE,M
IN WORLD POLITICS 399, 404-05 (Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl and Willy Pstreng eds.,
1991) [hereinafter Falk] (commenting that the South American claimants would likely
insist on specific claims if the other nations threatened their territorial claims); see also
1992]
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The South American claimants assert that their territorial claims are
stronger than those of Great Britain.51 Chile and Argentina base this
conclusion on their relative proximity to Antarctica.52 Proximity as a
basis of jurisdiction is also called the theory of propinquity."3 The
South American claimants base their propinquity claim on either rela-
tive proximity or on the idea that the Andes are submerged at Tierra
del Fuego and resurface as the Antarctic peninsula.5"
Under international law, neither discovery nor propinquity has suffi-
cient judicial weight to settle territorial disputes,55 so claimants need
the additional support of effective occupation.5" Two cases, the Legal
Status of Eastern Greenland" and Island of Palmas5" indicate that
less is required to show occupation when an intemperate location is at
issue.59 The claimant states all have scientific bases in Antarctica, but
infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (explaining the bases of the Chilean and Ar-
gentinean claims).
51. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 30 (noting that geographical proximity is the
basis of the Arctic sector theory and that by virtue of this proximity, Chile and Argen-
tina are better able to conduct economic exploitation and scientific experiments).
52. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 30 (describing Chile and Argentina's relative
proximity to the Antarctic peninsula and the relative convenience this creates for pur-
poses of exploitation); see also Christopher C. Joyner, The Antarctic Legal Regime: An
Introduction, in THE ANTARCTIC LEGAL REGIME 1, 2 (Christopher C. Joyner &
Sudhir K. Chopra eds., 1988) (concluding that Argentina and Chile are most con-
cerned with Antarctica's strategic value because the continent is only 600 miles away).
53. See Benedetto Conforti, Territorial Claims in Antarctica: A Modern Way to
Deal with an Old Problem, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 249, 254 (1986) [hereinafter Con-
forti] (explaining that under the theory of propinquity, sovereignty over one part of a
geographic entity extends to all areas of that entity).
54. See MYHRE, supra note 30, at 13 (questioning the idea of sovereignty based on
geological affinity).
55. See, e.g. AUBURN, supra note 30, at 7 (remarking that official United States
policy does not support claims based exclusively on discovery, even though the United
States itself has attempted to assert such claims).
56. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 11-14 (discussing the principle of effective oc-
cupation as a standard of customary international law). Under the theory of effective
occupation, control must be actual, continuous, and useful. Id. at 11. These factors are,
however, evaluated leniently when the area involved is sparsely populated or inhospita-
ble. Id. at 13. Under such conditions, the more active party's claim should prevail. Id.
at 14.
57. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 53 (Apr. 5).
58. Island of Palmas (Netherlands v. United States), II R.I.A.A. 829 (1928).
59. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 12 (concluding that based upon the Island of
Palmas and Legal Status of Eastern Greenland cases, it is evident that the standards
by which effective occupation is judged are less for distant and uninhabited regions);
see also TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 43, at 7 (explaining that interna-
tional law indicates effective occupation should be determined by a flexible standard);
MYHRE, supra note 30, at I 1 (concluding that the law on title by occupation is unclear,
and is dependent upon the feasibility of occupation).
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these stations occupy only a small portion of the continent.60 To bolster
their claims of sovereignty, nations have shown their intent to remain
in Antarctica by increasing colonization efforts.61 Article IV of the
Antarctic Treaty has, at least temporarily, quieted disputes over terri-
torial sovereignty. 2 The territorial issue, however, continues to plague
those attempting to exercise jurisdiction in Antarctica.
3
B. THE ANTARTIC TREATY
1. Background
In 1934, Norway made the first proposal for an international confer-
ence to discuss the future of Antarctica.64 Due to the start of World
War II, this conference did not take place.60 The need for an interna-
tional meeting escalated in the early 1940s when British, Chilean, and
Argentinean naval activities in the area raised tensions between these
countries.66 Additionally, the establishment of new British and Ameri-
can bases on Stonington Island17 illustrated that new claims and con-
troversies were likely if an agreement were not reached regarding the
administration of Antarctica.68
60. See Conforti, supra note 53, at 255-56 (expressing doubt that the presence of
scientific research stations would be sufficient to substantiate a claim of territorial
sovereignty).
61. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 41-42 (suggesting that the relaxation of the ban
on women in Antarctica is a sign of permanency). For example, the Soviet Union sent
a plane carrying women and double beds to Antarctica in 1975. Id. at 42. Argentina
has sent the wives and children of soldiers stationed at Esperanza Base to Antarctica in
an effort to establish a colony. Id. Additionally, the son of the Argentine base com-
mander was born in Antarctica in 1978. Antarctica's First Baby Warmly Welcomed, 8
ANTARCTIC, Mar. 1978 at 169-70. Other efforts to display administrative control in-
clude the establishment of a post office. AUBURN, supra note 30, at 40-41.
62. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (explaining the compromise
reached regarding the sovereignty issue).
63. See infra notes 137-42, 152-55, 244-46 and accompanying text (describing how
sovereignty issues have made administration of environmental measures difficult).
64. Norwegian Memorandum to the United Kingdom Concerning the Order in
Council Establishing the Australian Antarctic Territory and Proposing Bilateral Dis-
cussions (Jan. 26, 1934) reprinted in ANTARCTICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COL-
LECTION OF INTER-STATE AND NATIONAL DOCUMENTS, Doc. AU-26011934 (W.M.
Bush ed., 1982).
65. TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 43, at 132.
66. TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 43, at 132.
67. See THE TIMiEs ATLAS OF THE WORLD, Plate 8 (John Bartholomew ed., 1958)
(displaying a map that includes Stonington Island). Stonington Island is located off
Trinity Peninsula, which is the area closest to South America. Id. Its coordinates are
67.55"S and 72.50"W Id.
68. TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 43, at 132.
19921
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In 1948, the United States initiated two proposals for Antarctica in
the United Nations. The first proposal recommended that Antarctica
be a trusteeship of the United Nations.69 The second proposal called for
the establishment of a multiple condominium 70 of claimants and the
United States.7 1 Under the latter proposal, the State Department of the
United States suggested that Antarctica be used for scientific investiga-
tion and research.72 The suggestions of the United States prompted
Chile to contend that any new bases, expeditions, or activities in the
Antarctic region would prejudice existing rights of sovereignty. 3 Nego-
tiations ceased when the Korean War began.
7 4
In the late 1940s, the International Council of Scientific Unions
(ICSU) decided to implement a third Polar Year, which would be
called the International Geophysical Year (IGY).7 5 The ICSU organ-
ized the IGY as an eighteen month program, from June 1, 1951 until
December 31, 1952, during which scientists would undertake a battery
of research on the Antarctic Continent. 6 The parties to the Antarctic
portion of the IGY7 7 entered into a "gentleman's agreement" that no
activities pursuant to the IGY were permitted to be used as a means of
69. See TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 43, at 132. (explaining that the
trusteeship would be carried out under the auspices of Chapter XII of the United Na-
tions Charter).
70. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 351-56 (5th ed. 1935)
(defining "condominium" as an international law term for a territory under the joint
tenancy of two or more states). Within the multiple condominium, sovereignty is exer-
cised jointly. Id.
71. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 85 (stating that in 1948 the United States
produced a sketchy draft for a multiple condominium).
72. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 85-86 (explaining that both proposals were
driven by a perceived necessity to prevent future conflict regarding the continent); see
also MYHRE, supra note 30, at 29 (describing the condominium proposal as legally
contentious because the United States had never recognized any of the claimant states'
rights over sectors in Antarctica).
73. AUBURN, supra note 30, at 86.
74. AUBURN, supra note 30, at 86.
75. See MERICQ, supra note 17, at 49 (stating that the first two Polar Years were
in 1882 and 1931). The Polar Years were cooperative international efforts aimed at
organizing human activities in the Arctic and Antarctic. SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at
83. During the first Polar Year, forty stations were established in the Arctic. Id. The
second Polar Year resulted in many important atmospheric discoveries. Id.
76. See generally MERICQ, supra note 17, at 82-84 (detailing the organization and
planning behind the IGY). The British, French, American, and Belgian scientists did
most of the organization and tried to institutionalize the cooperative spirit with which
the IGY was planned. Id.
77. See Trolle-Anderson, supra note 29, at 58 (stating that the IGY Antarctic par-
ticipants were the seven nations with territorial claims, the United States, the Soviet
Union, Belgium, South Africa, and Japan).
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asserting, supporting, or refuting a territorial claim.78 During the IGY,
the Antarctic participants79 established permanent bases inland.80
When the Soviet Union announced that it would maintain the bases
which it had established during the IGY and make a connected sector
claim, the other parties to the IGY sought a more permanent solution
to the territorial dispute.8' The resulting negotiations culminated in the
Antarctic Treaty. 2
2. Treaty Provisions
The Antarctic Treaty recognizes that Antarctica, the only continent
that does not have a native population, holds a special place in interna-
tional law and should be preserved. 83 The Treaty is unique in interna-
tional affairs because it sets aside an entire continent for peaceful pur-
poses 4 and provides that representatives of every country are to have
access to information from all other countries engaged in activities on
78. See SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at 84-86 (explaining that the "gentleman's agree-
ment" was politically significant because it allowed nations to establish stations within
another country's territory without threatening either country's sovereignty claims); see
also TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 43, at 134-36 (evaluating the argument
that the tacit acceptance of the "gentleman's agreement" could be binding on the par-
ties under principles of customary international law and concluding that the argument,
though pleasing, is flawed).
79. See supra note 77 (listing the countries which participated in the IGY activities
in Antarctica).
80. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 93 (explaining that prior to the IGY the only
permanent bases in Antarctica were on the northern Antarctic Peninsula). The creation
of permanent inland bases was significant because it symbolized an intent to remain
and established the importance of scientific activities in Antarctica. Id.
81. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 89 (characterizing the Soviet announcement as
the catalyst to the Treaty negotiations).
82. AUBURN, supra note 30, at 89.
83. Treaty, supra note 5, at pmbl. The Preamble to the Antarctic Treaty reads as
follows:
Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall con-
tinue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become
the scene or object of international discord;
Acknowledging the substantial contributions to scientific knowledge resulting
from international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica;
Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation for the continuation and
development of such cooperation on the basis of freedom of scientific investiga-
tion in Antarctica as applied during the International Geophysical Year accords
with the interests of science and the progress of all mankind;
Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use of Antarctica for peaceful pur-
poses only and the continuance of international harmony in Antarctica will fur-
ther the purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations. ...
Id.
84. Treaty, supra note 5, art. 1(1); see infra note 88 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing art. 1(2) and its interpretation).
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the continent. 85 The disadvantage of this flexible system is that Antarc-
tica has no permanent governing body; the Treaty provides only that
representatives of the original parties will meet every two years to dis-
cuss issues."6 To understand fully how the system works, it is necessary
to examine the most important provisions of the Treaty.
a. Peaceful Purposes
The goal of the Antarctic Treaty, as stated in Article I, is to ensure
that the continent is used only for peaceful purposes. 87 The term
"peaceful purposes" is not defined by the Treaty, but scholars have in-
terpreted it using an objective test.88 This does not prohibit nations
from using military personnel or equipment to perform scientific re-
85. Treaty, supra note 5, art. III(1). Article III, in relevant part, states as follows:
In order to promote international cooperation in scientific investigation in Ant-
arctica, as provided for in Article II of the present Treaty, the Contracting Par-
ties agree that, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable:
(a) information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica shall be
exchanged to permit maximum economy and efficiency of operations;
(b) scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between expeditions
and stations;
(c) scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged and
made freely available.
Id.
86. Treaty, supra note 5, art. IX(l). Article IX provides as follows:
Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in the preamble to the pre-
sent Treaty shall meet at the City of Canberra within two months after the date
of entry into force of the Treaty, and thereafter at suitable intervals and places,
for the purpose of exchanging information, consultinh [sic] together on matters
of common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and considering,
and recommending to their Governments, measures in furtherance of the princi-
ples and objectives of the Treaty, including measures regarding:
(a) use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only;
(b) facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica;
(c) facilitation of international scientific cooperation in Antarctica;
(d) facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided for in Arti-
cle VII of the Treaty;
(e) questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica;
(f) preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica.
Id.
87. Treaty, supra note 5, art. I(1). Article I(1) provides that "Antarctica shall be
used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a
military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the car-
rying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons." Id.
88. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 97 (suggesting that the term "peaceful pur-
poses" should be naturally construed and should not be interpreted to include all activi-
ties which are not clearly military).
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search.89 Article I of the Treaty does not apply to the high seas, but
rather only to the continent itself. 0
The main use of Antarctica is as a site for scientific research. To
ensure cooperation and exchange of information, the Treaty provides
that parties to the Treaty shall be as open as practicable. 1 To this
end, Contracting Parties92 are allowed to designate representatives to
inspect any other party's scientific operations. 93 By stressing the scien-
tific use of Antarctica, the framers were able to keep the IGY scheme
and not address mining and other commercial issues.
9 '
89. Treaty, supra note 5, art. 1(2). See MYHRE, supra note 30, at 35 (explaining
that Article 1(2) was included as an acknowledgement of the logistical difficulties in-
herent in Antarctic activities). These difficulties are often best solved by the military.
Id.
90. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 98 (explaining that Article VI, which states
that nothing in the Treaty shall prejudice existing freedoms (the high seas, for exam-
ple), trumps Article I).
91. See Treaty, supra note 5, art. III (providing that parties shall, to the extent
feasible, exchange the following: their plans for scientific programs; scientific personnel;
and scientific observations and results); see also AUBURN, supra note 30, at 103 (stat-
ing that the Parties do not carry out their reporting duties and little is done to rectify
this lapse); infra note 117 and accompanying text (evaluating the success of this
provision).
92. See MYHRE, supra note 30, at 39 (explaining that the there are two types of
parties to the Antarctic Treaty: Contracting and Consultative). Contracting Parties are
the original signatories and those nations which have acceded to the Treaty. Id. A
country that is a member of the United Nations may accede to the Treaty by deposit-
ing an instrument of accession with the United States government. Id. Countries that
are not members of the United Nations must be unanimously approved by the Con-
tracting Parties. Id. In addition to those listed below as Consultative Parties, the Con-
tracting Parties are Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Den-
mark, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
Papua New Guinea, Romania, and Switzerland. Final Report on the Eleventh Consult-
ative Meeting, supra note 4, at 1-2.
Consultative Parties are those who are permitted to attend the Consultative Meet-
ings. MYHRE, supra note 30, at 39. The original signatories are automatically granted
Consultative status. Id. Consultative status is given to other nations only if they express
sufficient interest in Antarctica to convince all of the original signatories that granting
Consultative status is appropriate. Id. Sufficient interest is shown by establishing a base
or sending an expedition to Antarctica. Id. The Consultative Parties are Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, India,
Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru,
Poland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. Final Report of the Eleventh Con-
sultative Meeting, supra note 4, at 1.
93. Treaty, supra note 5, art. VII. See SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at 95 (noting that
the Antarctic Treaty is the only international agreement to which the Soviet Union is a
party that permits on-site unilateral inspection).
94. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 99 (suggesting that the framers emphasized
science as a political necessity). Auburn asserts that scientific activities are relatively
non-controversial and shift the focus away from sovereignty issues. Id.
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b. Sovereignty Issues
Article IV of the Treaty further implements the IGY suggestions by
maintaining the status quo with respect to territorial claims.a The diffi-
culty inherent in codifying the IGY position on sovereignty is that the
framers did not intend the IGY to be a permanent solution, but rather
a portion of an agreement which was to be in effect for eighteen
months."6 This position was taken in an effort to placate a wide range
of opinions expressed during Treaty negotiations. 7 Article IV does not
resolve the territorial disputes, but rather attempts to make them a
non-issue." This effort, however, has not quieted discussion of territo-
rial issues, and sovereignty continues to be a heavily debated topic at
Consultative Meetings."
There is significant debate regarding whether third parties are bound
by Article IV of the Treaty. 100 Under international law, a third party
may be bound by a treaty only if the parties to the treaty clearly ex-
press their intent to be bound and if the third party expresses, in writ-
95. Treaty, supra note 5, art. IV(I). Article IV provides that nothing contained in
the Treaty shall be interpreted as a renunciation or diminution of territorial claims, nor
shall any Contracting Party's activities affect the recognition of another party's claims.
Id. Article IV also states that no activities which take place while the Treaty is in force
shall constitute a basis for new territorial claims. Id. art. IV(2). See AUBURN, supra
note 30, at 107-10 (stating that although the Treaty has effectively maintained the
status quo, there has been considerable discussion regarding the sovereignty issue and
proposed outcomes if the Treaty system were disbanded).
96. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 93 (suggesting that the defects in the construc-
tion of Article IV are directly related to the IGY).
97. See, e.g., MYHRE, supra note 30, at 36 (explaining that although New Zealand
was willing to surrender its claim of territorial sovereignty in favor of an international
regime, Chile refused to alter its position).
98. See Beck, supra note 36, at 233 (maintaining that Article IV freezes individual
legal positions rather than solving sovereignty disputes); AUBURN, supra note 30, at
108-10 (describing Article IV as an attempt to sweep sovereignty issues "under a con-
venient rug" and maintaining that, in the long-run, this approach will be unsuccessful).
99. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 108 (citing Argentinean concern that a recom-
mendation concerning historic sites was really an effort to put a large section of the
Antarctic Peninsula under British control). Sovereignty was also a contested issue dur-
ing the negotiation of the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna
and Flora. Id.
100. See, e.g., FRANCISCO 0. VICUPJA, ANTARCTIC MINERAL EXPLOITATION: THE
EMERGING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 423-47 (1988) [hereinafter VICUPA, ANTARCTIC MIN-
ERAL EXPLOITATION] (evaluating the role of third parties in Antarctica in light of cus-
tomary environmental law); Patricia Birnie, The Antarctic Regime and Third States,
in ANTARCTIC CHALLENGE II: CONFLICTING INTERESTS, COOPERATION, ENVIRONMEN-
TAL PROTECTION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 239 (Riidiger Wolfrum ed., 1988) (con-




ing, its willingness to be bound. 1' Thus, because Article IV does not
expressly state that it intends to bind third parties, a third party may
establish a claim to Antarctic territory.' 2 Were this to occur, however,
the affected Treaty party could look to the language of the Preamble,
which refers to the interests of mankind, as an expression of intent to
bind third parties under customary international law. 03
c. Administration of the Treaty
Although the Treaty provides that the Contracting Parties shall meet
at suitable intervals to conduct their business, it does not define "suita-
ble."' 1 The parties have interpreted "suitable" as meaning approxi-
mately once every two years.' At these meetings the parties may issue
Consultative Meeting Recommendations that they have drafted prior to
the meeting.10 6 To take effect, the parties must adopt these recommen-
dations unanimously.' Although the Treaty drafters adopted this re-
quirement to protect minority interests,108 it is problematic given the
101. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 63 Am. J. INT'L L.
875, art. 35. See also Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795 (D. Kan. 1980)
(holding in a case concerning human rights, that international rules are binding upon
nations only when the nation intended to be bound or when the rule at issue is one of
customary international law).
102. See TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 43, at 149-50 (asserting that
Article IV(l) does not prevent third parties from making claims to Antarctica).
103. See TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 43, at 140-50 (discussing the
effects of Article IV on third parties and concluding that although there may be no
clear intent to bind third parties, it is likely that claimant states would be permitted to
use their post-1961 activities to strengthen their sovereignty claims).
104. Treaty, supra note 5, art. IX. Article IX provides that the Contracting Parties
are to meet at suitable intervals to formulate and consider measures regarding the
peaceful use of Antarctica, continued scientific cooperation, the rights of inspection set
forth in Article VII, questions regarding jurisdiction, and the preservation and conser-
vation of living resources. Id.
105. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 153-55 (concluding that meeting every two
years is not sufficient for dealing with the numerous issues that arise).
106. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 153-54 (explaining that because the Consulta-
tive Meetings take place only once every two years, the parties usually hold lengthy
preparatory meetings to discuss and prepare recommendations on topics to be discussed
at the next meeting). These preparatory meetings lack the power to make decisions, but
help set the agenda for future Consultative Meetings. Id.
107. See Treaty, supra note 5, art. IX(4) (stating that representatives of all the
Contracting Parties must approve measures before they become effective); see also
Trolle-Anderson, supra note 29, at 61 (commenting that within the framework of the
Consultative Meetings, decisions are not forced through against the will of any party,
thereby strengthening the desire to reach a consensus).
108. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 159 (noting that the unanimity provision
means that any one party can stop a measure from becoming effective, and asserting
that the unanimity provision is unnecessary because the Rules of Procedure already
adequately safeguard the interests of minorities).
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infrequency of meetings.1"9 The provision is, however, indicative of the
careful crafting of the Treaty.110 The drafters were so anxious to pre-
serve the agreement that they did not even establish a minimum form
of international organization."'
The success of the Antarctic Treaty is attributable to its flexibil-
ity. 12 For example, membership in the Treaty can change because it is
open for accession. 1 3 The ease of modifying and amending the Treaty
is a further indication of its flexibility." 4 On the other hand, the loose
structure of the Treaty's administration contributes to its weak-
nesses." While the Treaty instructs parties to comply with the Charter
of the United Nations to ensure that the principles of the Treaty are
carried out,"' no other guidelines are set forth. As a result, parties
often do not perform their reporting duties and do little to ensure com-
pliance with the Treaty." 7 Furthermore, under the Antarctic Treaty,
the only methods of dispute resolution are negotiation, arbitration, or,
109. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 160-61 (explaining that negotiations following
a veto can be lengthy and citing, as an example, the fact that it took over eight years to
reach a compromise resource regime on pelagic seals). The unanimity requirement
could also be problematic if a party used its voting status to further its outside inter-
ests. Id. For example, a member could veto a measure allowing resource exploitation to
protect its domestic interest in maintaining a high price on that commodity. Id.
110. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 147 (explaining that the Treaty is a compro-
mise between conflicting views, and that some of the Parties were vehemently opposed
to a system that imposed any type of supranational control).
11l. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 155 (commenting that the Treaty does not
even establish archival facilities or a fixed meeting place). Consultative meetings are
rotated among the capital cities of the Consultative Parties. Id.
112. See Trolle-Anderson, supra note 29, at 57-64 (commenting that since the
Treaty entered into force in 1961, it has managed to maintain a multi-national order
and preserve Antarctica as a place used exclusively for peaceful purposes and scientific
research, in marked contrast to the tumult the rest of the world has experienced over
the same period).
113. See Treaty, supra note 5, art. XIII(l) (providing that members of the United
Nations may join the Treaty by accession, as may any other nation that is invited by
the Contracting Parties).
114. See Treaty, supra note 5, art. XII(1) (providing for modification or amend-
ment of the Treaty by unanimous agreement of the Parties). To enter into force, notice
of ratification by that party must be received by the depository government. Id. If
notice of ratification is not received within two years by a Contracting Party, that
Party is deemed to have withdrawn from the Treaty. Id.
115. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 155 (explaining that the Antarctic Treaty
system deliberately has no form of international administration and that attempts to
create an effective management system have been vociferously opposed).
116. Treaty, supra note 5, art. X.
117. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 103 (indicating that from 1964 to 1969, only
sixty percent of the reports on the killing and capturing of native birds and animals
were filed, and that some countries provided no information at all on their activities).
But see id. at 110-11 (stating that reports of inspections have concluded that there was
no evidence that the Treaty had been breached).
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if all the parties to the dispute agree, adjudication by the International
Court of Justice. s
II. EARLIER EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE ANTARCTIC
ENVIRONMENT
The relative ease of creating measures to be used in connection with
the Antarctic Treaty has led to a number of efforts to protect the envi-
ronment. 1 9 Effectiveness, however, requires more than ease of promul-
gation: there must also be a means of administering and enforcing the
rules. As was indicated above, administration can be problematic be-
cause some of the parties to the Antarctic Treaty refuse to establish a
formal administrative body.120 The absence of such a framework, in
turn, leads to enforceability problems.
21
A. MEASURES WITHIN THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM
1. Agreed Measures on the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and
Flora
In 1964, the representatives at the Consultative Meeting promul-
gated the Agreed Measures on the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna
and Flora (Agreed Measures). 22 The representatives wrote the Agreed
Measures to fall squarely within the bounds of the Antarctic Treaty.123
The measures attempted to fulfill the principles and goals of the
118. See Treaty, supra note 5, art. XI (emphasizing peaceful, inter-party methods
for settling disputes as preferable to the International Court of Justice). The Interna-
tional Court of Justice should be used only as a last resort. Id.
119. See infra notes 122-56 and accompanying text (setting forth earlier measures
taken to protect Antarctica and assessing their effectiveness).
120. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (describing the lack of an adminis-
trative body as one of the principal weaknesses of the Antarctic Treaty system).
121. See Barnes, Protection of the Environment, supra note 3, at 200 (explaining
that the Antarctic Treaty system has no internal enforcement mechanisms, which les-
sens the likelihood of compliance). The current system relies upon the individual par-
ties' interpretations of measures, rather than an objective reading. Id.
122. Agreed Measures for Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora. Approved
as Recommendation III-VIII to the Antarctic Treaty, reprinted in I ANTARCTICA AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF INTER-STATE AND NATIONAL DoCu?.siENTs,
Doc. AT-02067964 (W.M. Bush ed., 1982) [hereinafter Agreed Measures]. Fauna
and flora are the animals and plants occupying a particular environment or region. I I
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 54 (Int'l ed. 1983). The Agreed Measures are the
result of Consultative Meetings and bind only parties to the Antarctic Treaty.
SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at 106. The Agreed Measures designate the area south of 60"
South as a "Special Conservation Area" in which any type of injury to native mam-
mals or birds is prohibited. Id.
123. See Heap & Holdgate, supra note 10, at 203 (describing the Agreed Mea-
sures as a "treaty within a treaty" or a "mini-treaty").
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Antarctic Treaty with respect to human activities related to native
plants and animals.12 ' The Agreed Measures, like Article I of the
Treaty,12 5 restrict the scope of application to the Antarctic continent. 2
The chief drawbacks of the Agreed Measures are their limited zone of
applicability 2 7 and lack of built-in enforcement procedures.128
2. Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals
The Parties issued the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic
Seals (Seals Convention) in 1972.129 The Seals Convention is notable
because it was promulgated as a preventative measure, rather than as a
reaction to a threat to the species.' 30 Since the Seals Convention went
into effect, there has been no commercial seal hunting in the
Antarctic.31
3. The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Re-
sources (CCAMLR) was the first attempt by the parties to the
124. See Beck, supra note 36, at 242 (discussing the Agreed Measures as a means
of working with the Treaty's designation of Antarctica as a Special Conservation Area
in which human activities relating to animals are closely regulated). Within the Special
Conservation Area, humans may not kill, wound, capture, or molest birds or mammals
without a permit. SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at 106.
125. See supra note 87 (setting forth art. I(1)).
126. See Beck, supra note 36, at 242 (stating that the Agreed Measures do not
apply to the high seas surrounding Antarctica).
127. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 270 (noting that the Agreed Measures are
applicable only to the land below 60 ° South, even though Antarctic fauna and flora,
which are concentrated in coastal areas, are dependent upon the ocean for food).
128. See AUBURN, supra note 30, at 272 (stating that the Agreed Measures offer
few guidelines as to who may issue permits, and what area those permits may cover).
Sovereignty is at issue here because parties were reluctant to allow the representative
of one party to undercut their authority by issuing a permit affecting other parties'
territories. Id.
129. Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, opened for signature June
1, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 441, 11 I.L.M. 251 [hereinafter Seals Convention].
130. See John A. Gulland, The Antarctic Treaty System as a Resource Manage-
ment Mechanism, in THE ANTARCTIC TREATY REGIME 116, 120 (Gillian D. Triggs ed.,
1987) [hereinafter Gulland] (remarking that when the Seals Convention was promul-
gated, there was no commercial harvesting of seals, only a concern that harvesting
might start). Thus, rather than responding to a crisis, the Seals Convention protected a
species before commercial activity threatened it. Id.
131. See Heap & Holdgate, supra note 10, at 203 (conceding that the Seals Con-
vention has been very successful, but questioning how much of the decline in seal hunt-
ing is due to the agreement and how much is attributable to logistical difficulties and
cost).
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Antarctic Treaty to regulate an ecosystem as a whole."8 2 The parties
wrote the CCAMLR in response to the increased interest in krill fish-
ing in the early 1970s. 33 The CCAMLR is applicable beyond 60"
South Latitude, using the Antarctic Convergence as an outer bound-
ary.1 34 The parties extended the range of applicability beyond the
Treaty's 60* boundary because krill swim beyond that mark as far
north as the Convergence.-
35
Sovereignty issues played a part in the drafting of the CCAMLR
because, due to its subject matter, the parties were seeking to regulate
activities beyond the Antarctic continent."36 Once again, as with the
Treaty, the representatives agreed to disagree.137  Within the
CCAMLR regime the parties exercise joint jurisdiction over the
marine areas. 38 The weaknesses of the CCAMLR are easily traced to
the sovereignty issue; because the Treaty created a delicate balance on
the sovereignty issue, the drafters were reluctant to create a marine
regime that was anything other than sovereignty-neutral. 39 As a result,
the Convention is legislation with an admirable purpose, but lacks spec-
132. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May
20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3479, 19 I.L.M. 841 [hereinafter CCAMLR] (entered into force
Apr. 7, 1982). See Josyane Couratier, The Regime for the Conservation of Antarc-
tica's Living Resources, in ANTARCTIC REsoURCES PoUcY 139, 141 (Francisco 0. Vi-
cufia ed., 1983) (stating that it is crucial to regulate the Antarctic ecosystem as a
whole because it is extraordinarily simple, yet extremely interdependent). So, if one
part of the ecosystem is harmed, all other areas will likely suffer as well. Id.
133. See Heap & Holdgate, supra note 10, at 203-04 (asserting that krill have a
slow growth rate and increased harvesting would eventually deplete the population).
134. Heap & Holdgate, supra note 10, at 203. The Antarctic Convergence is the
fluctuating border between the Antarctic and Southern Oceans. SHAPLEY, sUpra note
19, at 95.
135. See SHAPLEY, supra note 19, at 151-52 (explaining that conservationists view
the enlarged zone of applicability as a victory because it is based not on human, artifi-
cial boundaries, but rather on the krill's natural habitat).
136. See Beck, supra note 36, at 245 (explaining that the question of coastal juris-
diction over marine resources brought the underlying issues of territorial sovereignty
back to the forefront).
137. See CCAMLR, supra note 132, art. IV (providing that nothing in the Con-
vention shall constitute a basis for a new claim, nor shall it be interpreted as renounc-
ing, diminishing, or prejudicing any claim to the Antarctic continent).
138. See Christopher C. Joyner, The Evolving Antarctic Legal Regime: Review Ar-
ticle, 83 Ai. J. INT'L L. 618, 630 (1989) (characterizing the joint control over mari-
time spaces as a "de facto regional Exclusive Economic Zone").
139. See Beck, supra note 36, at 245-46 (describing the situation as "bi-foecalism"
and concluding that bi-focalism may resolve conflicts with respect to the sovereignty
issue, but weakens the rest of the CCAMLR's provisions). Rather than stating that the
Parties exercise jurisdiction over the coastal areas adjacent to their claims, the
CCAMLR provides few answers and establishes de facto joint control. Id.
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ificity. 140 Additionally, the CCAMLR is weakened because it does not
have an effective means of enforcement.
14 1
4. The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource
Activities
Six years lapsed between the entry into force of the CCAMLR and
the promulgation of the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic
Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA),' 2 the mineral portion of a
resource protection plan for Antarctica. 14 3 For the purposes of this
Comment, the relevant provisions of the CRAMRA are its environ-
mental and sovereignty laws, which need to be explored further. 44
140. See, e.g., William N. Bonner, Recent Developments in Antarctic Conserva-
tion, in THE ANTARCTIC TREATY REGIME: LAW, ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCES 143,
145 (Gillian D. Triggs ed., 1987) (commenting that the CCAMLR has lofty aspira-
tions, but insufficient means with which to enforce them). Once again, to avoid poten-
tial conflicts, the parties made the enforcement procedures deliberately ambiguous.
TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 43, at 196. The Convention does not address
what would happen if a party attempted to enforce its domestic conservation legisla-
tion, or what would happen if two parties asserted jurisdiction over the same area. Id.
at 197.
141. See CCAMLR, supra note 132, art. 21 (stating, in relevant part, that "[each
Party] shall take appropriate measures within its competence to ensure compliance
with the provisions of this Convention").
142. Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities,
opened for signature Nov. 25, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 859 [hereinafter CRAMRA]. The
CRAMRA is also called the "Wellington Convention" and the "Antarctic Minerals
Convention." Andrew N. Davis, Note, Protecting Antarctica: Will a Minerals Agree-
ment Guard the Door or Open the Door to Commercial Exploitation?, 23 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 733, 733 n.1 (1990). The CRAMRA may have been so long in
the making because the Consultative Parties were occupied with negotiating sessions,
during which they attempted to reach a consensus on the sovereignty issue. Beck, supra
note 36, at 246.
143. See Christopher C. Joyner, CRAMRA: The Ugly Duckling of the Antarctic
Treaty System?, in THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM IN WORLD POLITICS 161, 166
(Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl & Willy Pstreng eds., 1991) [hereinafter Joyner, CRAMRA:
The Ugly Duckling] (stating that the CRAMRA is the natural completion of an envi-
ronmental protection system that includes measures relating to fauna and flora, seals,
and marine living resources); but see Barnes, Protection of the Environment, supra
note 3, at 194 (asserting that the CRAMRA is not a conservation agreement, but
rather a system that will allow mineral extraction).
144. For a thorough discussion of the entire act, see, e.g., Andrew N. Davis, Note,
Protecting Antarctica: Will a Minerals Agreement Guard the Door or Open the Door
to Commercial Exploitation?, 23 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 733 (1990) [here-
inafter Davis, Protecting Antarctica] (analyzing the provisions of the CRAMRA, with
particular attention to the environmental side-effects of mining activities); see also
Douglas M. Zang, Note, Frozen in Time: The Antarctic Mineral Resource Convention,
76 CORNELL L. REV. 722 (1991) [hereinafter Zang, Frozen in Time] (discussing the
CRAMRA and suggesting that an alternative system of mineral rights is needed to
promote a truly international community of rights).
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The CRAMRA states that before mineral activities may occur, the
actor must evaluate the impact that the proposed activity will have on
the environment.1 45 If the activity might cause significant damage, it
may not be performed.1 46 The actor must also prepare an environmen-
tal impact assessment. ' This document requires the potential miner to
determine the effect that the proposed activity will have on air and
water quality and the atmospheric, terrestrial, or marine environ-
ments.148 The environmental aspects of the CRAMRA also provide
that the actor will be held strictly liable for damage caused to the
Antarctic environment or ecosystems.1 49 Notwithstanding the safe-
guards set forth above, the environmental severity of potential mining
activities is unclear.15
The CRAMRA adopts the now standard protection of territorial in-
terests language.1 51 Thus, although the CRAMRA goes beyond earlier
efforts to protect the environment, it is burdened with the same prob-
lem that has plagued the Antarctic Treaty System since its inception:
145. See CRAMRA, supra note 142, art. 4 (setting forth a series of elements to be
considered subjectively when deciding how the activity will affect the Antarctic envi-
ronment). These elements include whether or not the proposed activity would cause any
of the following:
(a) significant adverse impacts on air and water quality;
(b) significant changes in atmospheric, terrestrial, or marine environments-
(c) significant changes in the distribution, abundance, or productivity of popu-
lations of species of fauna or flora;
(d) further jeopardy to endangered or threatened species or populations of
such species; or
(e) degradation of, or substantial risk to, areas of special biological, scientific,
historic, aesthetic or wilderness significance.
Id. art. 4(2).
146. CRAMRA, supra note 142, art. 4(2). Article 4 does not define significant
impact. Id.
147. See CRAMRA, supra note 142, art. 4 (requiring the Party to show that the
proposed mineral activity will not adversely affect the Antarctic environment, including
its ecosystems).
148. See CRAMRA, supra note 142, art. 4(2) (requiring that an environmental
impact assessment be performed).
149. See CRAMRA, supra note 142, art. 8(2)(d). The party causing damage to
the Antarctic environment must return the area to its status quo ante, or if that is not
possible, pay monetary damages. Davis, Protecting Antarctica, supra note 144, at 755.
Additionally, the sponsoring state is liable for damages which would not have occurred
but for its failure to comply with the CRAMRA. Id. at 756.
150. See Joyner, CRAMRA: The Ugly Duckling. supra note 143, at 169 (re-
marking that there is no way to determine how mining will affect the heretofore rela-
tively pristine environment); Davis, Protecting Antarctica, supra note 144, at 741 (stat-
ing that the existence and exploitability of mineral and hydrocarbon resources is
unknown, and no commercially valuable oil and gas deposits have been found).
151. See Beck, supra note 36, at 249-50 (stating that CRAMRA adopts the
Treaty's Article IV language regarding the establishment, diminution, renunciation of,
or prejudice to Antarctic claims).
1992]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the unwillingness to resolve the sovereignty issue. Sovereignty is an in-
herent issue when discussing mineral extraction. 152 When a party de-
cides to remove minerals from an area of land over which sovereignty is
in dispute, it is unclear who can authorize or decline the move. 153
Rather than deciding the sovereignty issue, CRAMRA requires a ma-
jority decision on all issues of substance.1 54 The enforcement proce-
dures of the CRAMRA155 also weaken its effectiveness because they do
not require reports on exploration and development. 156
B. ENVIRONMENTAL EFFORTS FROM OUTSIDE THE ANTARCTIC
TREATY SYSTEM
1. The United Nations and Antarctica
The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) held a con-
ference in June 1992, at which representatives discussed the major ac-
tions needed to safeguard the global environment.15 7 Although UNEP
has not been directly involved in Antarctic affairs, its members recog-
nize that the polar regions play an important role in the global environ-
ment."' Commentators have, therefore, suggested that Antarctica
should be subject to UNEP's requirements. 159
152. See Beck, supra note 36, at 248-51 (suggesting that minerals provoke the sov-
ereignty issue more than living resources because they are fixed in one location and are
non-renewable).
153. Beck, supra note 36, at 248-51.
154. See Beck, supra note 36, at 248-49 (explaining that major decisions cannot be
made which are against the wishes of any one group, but that a single claimant can be
out-voted).
155. See CRAMRA, supra note 142, art. 3 (stating that no mineral activity can
take place which is not in accordance with the CRAMRA); see also id. art. 7 (setting
forth the general compliance duties of the parties).
156. CRAMRA, supra note 142, art. 37(8)(c).
157. Sveneld Evteev, Antarctica and its Place in the Contemporary Environmental
Movement, in THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM IN WORLD POLITICS 147, 147 (Arnfinn
Jorgensen-Dahl & Willy Pstreng eds., 1991) [hereinafter Evteev].
158. See Evteev, supra note 157, at 147-50 (explaining that UNEP is concerned
about events in Antarctica which affect the environment). UNEP uses a United States
station in Antarctica as part of its Global Environmental Monitoring System. Id. at
150.
159. See Evteev, supra note 157, at 150-51 (suggesting that Antarctica should be
subject to UNEP's requirements for Environmental Impact Assessments and review by
all parties to strengthen control over Antarctic activities). The Antarctic environment
affects the ecosystems of the Southern Ocean. Id. Therefore, those nations with an
interest in the welfare of the Southern Ocean's ecosystems should receive assurance




Since the IGY, member nations have suggested that Antarctica
should be governed by the United Nations. 160 This move would accept
Antarctica, like the high seas and outer space, as a part of the global
commons. 6 The transfer would be advantageous because more coun-
tries would have a say in Antarctic activities. 62 It would also allow the
global community greater access to more information regarding
Antarctic activities. 63
2. Non-Governmental Organizations and Antarctica
The two non-governmental organizations most involved in Antarctica
are Greenpeace and the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition
(ASOC). 11' Both groups have urged that Antarctica be declared a
World Park.'65 Under this concept, the claimant countries would relin-
quish their territorial claims in favor of administration by an interna-
tional organization such as the United Nations. 66 It is unlikely that
160. See KLOTZ, supra note 27, at 105-15 (detailing the diplomatic assault aimed
at placing Antarctica under the governance of the United Nations).
161. See Barnes, Protection of the Environment. supra note 3, at 214-15 (explain-
ing that in 1990, the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to desig-
nate Antarctica as a World Park, making it a part of the global commons).
162. KLOTZ, supra note 27, at 113.
163. See Christian Maquieira, The Question of Antarctica in the United Nations:
The End of Consensus?, in ANTARCTIC CHALLENGE III: CONFLICTING INTERESTS, CO-
OPERATION, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, EcONOMtc DEVELOPMENT 254, 264 (Rudi-
ger Wolfrum ed., 1988) [hereinafter Maquieira] (stating that the current Antarctic
Treaty system is exclusive and information regarding the Parties' activities is
inaccessible).
164. See Barnes, Protection of the Environment. supra note 3, at 186-91 (outlining
the goals of NGOs involved in Antarctica, which include implementing a conservation
strategy that focuses on the ecosystem as a whole); see also James N. Barnes, Environ-
mental Protection and the Future of the Antarctic: New Approaches and Perspectives
are Necessary, in THE ANTARCTIC TREATY REGIME: LAW, ENVIRONMENT, AND RE-
SOURCES 150, 152 (Gillian D. Triggs ed., 1987) (explaining that ASOC is comprised of
over 150 organizations in more than 30 nations and was formed to provide a forum in
which NGOs could act on Antarctic environmental issues); but see Greenpeace Quits
Antarctica Base, Reuters, Feb. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters
File (announcing that Greenpeace will close its base in Antarctica because it is confi-
dent that the new environmental measures will preserve the continent).
165. James N. Barnes, Legal Aspects of Environmental Protection in Antarctica.
in THE ANTARCTIC LEGAL REGIME 241, 257 (Christopher C. Joyner & Sudhir K.
Chopra eds., 1988) [hereinafter Barnes, Legal Aspects].
166. See Legal Aspects, supra note 165, at 256-57 (explaining the history of the
World Park concept and the support given to the idea by New Zealand). Under the
World Park concept, the claimant parties would surrender their claims in favor of a
global administration. Barnes, Protection of the Environment. supra note 3, at 214-16.
Antarctica would be fully open to the United Nations, international organizations, and
NGOs. Id. at 216. Even though the formation of Antarctica as a World Park would
mean that the Consultative Parties would lose their interests in Antarctica, Australia
has supported the move for environmental reasons. BLAy, ANTARCTICA AFTERt 1991,
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claimant states would be willing to renounce their claims at the behest
of an NGO, even if it were for the benefit of the global environment. 167
III. PROTOCOL TO PROTECT THE ANTARCTIC
ENVIRONMENT: PROVISIONS
The Parties issued the Protocol on October 4, 1991168 after two years
of negotiation. 6 " President Bush submitted it to the United States Sen-
ate for ratification on February 14, 1992.17° The Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee accepted the Protocol on June 11, 1992.171
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE PROTOCOL
The preamble of the Protocol broadly defines its goal as the protec-
tion of the Antarctic environment. 7 The Protocol reaffirms that Ant-
supra note 3, at 18. New Zealand supports the proposition, but only if all the other
Parties also give up their rights. Barnes, Legal Aspects, supra note 165, at 257. Chile
would only support the World Park if it could retain its claim. Id.
167. See Maquieira, supra note 163, at 255-56 (describing the United Kingdom's
response to a Malaysian proposal that the United Nations discuss the question of con-
trol over Antarctica).
168. Protocol, supra note 7.
169. Antarctica Ecological Pact Signed, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5, 1991, at C2.
170. Bush Submits Antarctic Treaty to Senate, UPI, Feb. 14, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
171. Administration Opposes House Bill That Would Implement Antarctica
Treaty, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) (July 2, 1992).
172. Protocol, supra note 7, at pmbl. The preamble to the Protocol reads as
follows:
The States Parties to this Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Parties;
Convinced of the need to enhance the protection of the Antarctic environment
and dependent and associated ecosystems;
Convinced of the need to strengthen the Antarctic Treaty system so as to en-
sure that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord;
Bearing in mind the special legal and political status of Antarctica and the
special responsibility of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties to ensure that
all activities in Antarctica are consistent with the purposes and principles of the
Antarctic Treaty;
Recalling the designation of Antarctica as a Special Conservation Area and
other measures adopted under the Antarctic Treaty system to protect the
Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems;
Acknowledging further the unique opportunities Antarctica offers for scientific
monitoring of and research on processes of global as well as regional importance;
Reaffirming the conservation principles of the Convention on the Conservation
of Antarctic Marine Living Resources;
Convinced that the development of a comprehensive regime for the protection
of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems is in the
interest of mankind as a whole;
Desiring to supplement the Antarctic Treaty to this end;
866 [VOL. 7:843
1992] THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT 867
arctica is to be used for peaceful purposes only. 173 The Preamble em-
phasizes that protection of the Antarctic environment is necessary for
scientific reasons, 17 4 as well as in the interest of mankind.'7, Article 2
further enunciates the purpose of the Protocol and commits the Parties
to the protection of the environment.""
B. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE PROTOCOL
1. General Provisions
Article 1 defines the key terms used in the Protocol.'7 Article 4 ex-
plains that the Protocol does not modify or amend the Treaty, but in-
stead is supplementary. 178 Further, it explains that the Protocol does
not alter the rights and obligations of the parties. 17  Article 5 instructs
the parties to use the new provisions in conjunction with existing instru-
ments of the Antarctic Treaty.1 80 Because the Protocol applies to the
Antarctic Treaty area,'81 it does not apply to the high seas. 82 It does,
however, apply to the area below 60 ° South Latitude, including ice
shelves.' 8 3
Have agreed as follows....
Id.
173. See Protocol, supra note 7, at pmbl. (providing that Antarctica is to be used
for peaceful purposes and should not be the cause or location of international conflict).
174. See Protocol, supra note 7, at pmbl. (acknowledging that Antarctica affords
unique opportunities for scientific research of global importance).
175. Protocol, supra note 7, at pmbl.
176. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 2. Article 2 provides that "the Parties commit
themselves to the comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and depen-
dent and associated ecosystems and hereby designate Antarctica as a natural reserve,
devoted to peace and science." Id.
177. See Protocol, supra note 7, art. I (defining "Antarctic Treaty", "Antarctic
Treaty area", "Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings", "Antarctic Consultative Par-
ties", "Antarctic Treaty system", "Arbitral Tribunal," and "Committee").
178. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 4.
179. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 4.
180. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 5. Article 5 provides as follows:
The Parties shall consult and co-operate [sic] with the Contracting Parties to
the other international instruments in force within the Antarctic Treaty system
and their respective institutions with a view to ensuring the achievement of the
objectives and principles of this Protocol and avoiding any interference with the
achievement of the objectives and principles of those instruments or any inconsis-
tency between the implementation of those instruments and of this Protocol.
Id.
181. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 3(l). See id. art. l(b) (defining the Antarctic
Treaty area as the area to which the Treaty applies, in accordance with Article VI).
182. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (explaining that under Article VI of
the Treaty, the Treaty does not apply to the high seas).
183. Treaty, supra note 5, art. VI.
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2. Environmental Principles
Article 3 sets forth the environmental principles addressed by the
Protocol."" To conform to these principles, the parties must minimize
adverse environmental impacts when acting in Antarctica. 85 The ef-
fects that the Protocol seeks to minimize are set forth in Article
3(2)(b).1 88 When planning or conducting an activity, the actor must
use information that is sufficient to form a good assessment of the po-
tential environmental impacts.1 8 7 The actor is not only responsible for
assessing possible risks, but also for monitoring the activity once it be-
gins. 188 Parties must do so this to facilitate early detection of adverse
environmental impacts. 8 '
The Protocol instructs parties to cooperate when planning and con-
ducting activities within the Antarctic Treaty area. 90 Parties are also
directed to cooperate with third parties to minimize adverse environ-
184. See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 3 (declaring that the underlying principle of
the Protocol is the protection of the Antarctic environment, which is both inherently
valuable and also useful as an area for scientific research).
185. See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 3(2)(a) (stating that both the planning and
performing stages of an activity must be conducted so as to limit any adverse impact on
the environment).
186. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 3(2)(b). Activities should be planned and con-
ducted to avoid the following:
(i) adverse effects on the climate or weather patterns;
(ii) significant adverse effects on air or water quality;
(iii) significant changes in the atmospheric, terrestrial (including aquatic),
glacial or marine environments;
(iv) detrimental changes in the distribution, abundance or productivity of spe-
cies of fauna and flora;
(v) further jeopardy to endangered or threatened species or populations of
such species; or
(vi) degradation of, or substantial risk to, areas of biological, scientific, his-
toric, aesthetic or wilderness significance ....
Id.
187. See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 3(2)(c) (setting forth considerations for as-
sessing potential environmental impacts). Assessments should take full account of the
scope of the activity, its cumulative impacts, its potential detrimental effects on other
activities, whether there are safer alternatives, whether it is possible to fully monitor
the activity's effects on the environment, and whether it would be possible to respond
quickly in case of an emergency. Id.
188. See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 3(2)(d) (instructing that Parties must regu-
larly monitor and assess the environmental effects of ongoing activities).
189. See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 3(2)(e) (instructing that regular and effective
monitoring is necessary to detect unforeseen effects of activities both inside and outside
the Antarctic Treaty area).
190. See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 6(1) (stating that parties should help each
other by providing assistance in the preparation of environmental impact statements
and by providing information relevant to any potential environmental risk).
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mental effects."9' If a planned activity will have harmful effects on the
environment or ecosystems, the actor must modify, suspend, or cancel
the endeavor.'92
3. Mineral Resource Activities
The Protocol prohibits all mineral resource activities, unless they are
for scientific research.1 9 3 This was the most disputed provision of the
Protocol, and there is some speculation that the United States will not
ratify the document because of the mining ban.
19
4. Administration of the Protocol
The Committee for Environmental Protection will administer the
Protocol. 195 This Committee is responsible for presenting a report of all
its sessions to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting.190 Addition-
ally, the Committee is responsible for providing advice and formulating
recommendations to the parties with respect to the administration of
the Protocol. 9 7
191. See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 6(3) (providing that "the Parties shall cooper-
ate with those Parties which may exercise jurisdiction in areas adjacent to the
Antarctic Treaty area with a view to ensuring that activities in the Antarctic Treaty do
not have adverse environmental impacts on those areas").
192. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 3(4).
193. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 7. Article 7, entitled "Prohibition of Mineral Re-
source Activities," reads as follows: "Any activity relating to mineral resources, other
than scientific research shall be prohibited." Id.
194. See [Current Developments] Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 386 (July 17, 1991)
(stating that the United States argued for language which would allow any participat-
ing nation to withdraw from the ban and engage in unregulated mining after 50 years);
see also Gannett News Service, June 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Gannett File, Key Word: Flattau (chastising President Bush for calling himself the
"environmental president" when he was the impetus for the United States' insistence
that the Protocol include a walk-away clause with respect to the permanent mining
ban).
195. See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 11 (establishing the Committee for Environ-
mental Protection and providing that each Party is entitled to membership on the Com-
mittee). Contracting parties may have observer status on the Committee. Id.
196. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 11.
197. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 12(1). Article 12(1) provides:
The function of the Committee shall be to provide advice and formulate rec-
ommendations to the Parties in connection with the implementation of this Pro-
tocol .... In particular, it shall provide advice on:
(a) the effectiveness of measures taken pursuant to this Protocol;
(b) the need to update, strengthen or otherwise improve such measures;
(c) the need for additional measures, including the need for additional
Annexes, where appropriate;
(d) the application and implementation of the environmental impact as-
sessment procedures set out in Article 8 and Annex I;
19921
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5. Environmental Impact Assessments
The Protocol establishes a document called an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) that parties must complete before conducting a new
activity. 9 8 Activities are labelled according to their impact on the envi-
ronment.'9 9 Parties prepare an EIS, from which the impact is deter-
mined. If a proposed activity has no more than a minor or transitory
impact, it may proceed.200
However, if an activity has more than a minor or transitory impact,
and a Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation (CEE)21 is not pre-
pared, the concerned party must prepare an Initial Environmental
Evaluation (IEE).202 Like the EIS, if the IEE indicates that the activ-
ity will have no more than a minor or transitory impact, the activity
may proceed.20 3 However, if the IEE indicates that the proposed activ-
(e) means of minimising [sic] or mitigating environmental impacts of
activities in the Antarctic Treaty area;
(f) procedures for situations requiring urgent action, including response
action in environmental emergencies;
(g) the operation and further elaboration of the Antarctic Protected
Area System;
(h) inspection procedures, including formats for inspection reports and
checklists for the conduct of inspections;
(i) the collection, archiving, exchange and evaluation of information re-
lated to environmental protection;
() the state of the Antarctic environment; and
(k) the need for scientific research, including environmental monitoring,
related to the implementation of this Protocol.
Id.
198. See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 8(2) (establishing that for every activity for
which advance notice is required under Article VII (5) of the Antarctic Treaty, each
party shall comply with the assessment procedures set forth in Annex I); see also An-
nex I to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty [hereinafter
Annex I] (setting forth the steps in preparing an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS)). The Annex separates the EIS into three different documents: the preliminary
stage, the Initial Environmental Evaluation, and the Comprehensive Environmental
Evaluation. Id. art. 1-3.
199. See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 8 (identifying three levels of environmental
impact: (1) less than a minor or transitory impact; (2) a minor or transitory impact; or
(3) more than a minor or transitory impact). The Protocol does not define the above
terms. Id. art. 1.
200. Annex I, supra note 198, art. 1(2).
201. See infra note 204 and accompanying text (describing the CEE, the type of
information that it contains, and how it is prepared).
202. See Annex I, supra note 198, art. 2(1) (indicating that an lEE must contain
sufficient detail to assess the level of environmental impact). Relevant information in-
cludes the purpose, location, duration, and intensity of the proposed activity and con-
sideration of alternatives. Id.
203. See Annex I, supra note 198, art. 2(2) (allowing an activity which will have
no more than a minor or transitory impact to proceed, if procedures are adopted to
assess and verify the proposed activity's impact).
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ity will have more than a minor or transitory impact, another docu-
ment, called a Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation (CEE), must
be prepared.20 4 The decision on whether to proceed is based on the final
CEE.2 °5
6. Enforcement and Dispute Resolution
To ensure compliance with this Protocol, the parties must adopt ap-
propriate laws and regulations.206 When a party performs any activity
that affects the implementation of the Protocol, it must notify the other
parties of these measures. 20 1 The Consultative Parties must also ar-
range inspections of the stations in Antarctica.20 8 The parties may cre-
ate rules and procedures regarding damages arising from violations of
the Protocol.209
Disputes arising from the Protocol are heard in either the Interna-
tional Court of Justice or the Arbitral Tribunal. 210 The Arbitral Tribu-
nal lacks authority to decide any matter based on Article IV211 of the
Treaty.212 The Arbitral Tribunal uses a prima facie standard in deter-
mining whether it has jurisdiction to resolve a dispute.
213
204. Annex I, supra note 198, art. 3(1). See id. art 3(2) (listing the information
that must be present in the CEE, such as a description of the proposed activity, a
prediction of future environmental impact and the methods used to make the predic-
tions, consideration of the activity's cumulative impact, identification of measures to
minimize the impact, identification of unavoidable impacts, identification of gaps in
knowledge and uncertainties, a non-technical summary, and the name and address of
the CEE's preparer). A draft CEE must be forwarded to the Committee for Environ-
mental Protection at least 120 days before the next Consultative Meeting. Id. art. 3(4).
The draft CEE must also be made publicly available for comment. Id. at 3(3). The
activity may not proceed until there has been opportunity for evaluation of the CEE by
the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting. Id. art. 3(5). A final CEE must be pre-
pared which incorporates the comments received on the draft CEE. Id. art. 3(6).
205. Annex I, supra note 198, art. 4.
206. See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 13(3) (stating that the Parties shall "exert
appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that
no one engages in any activity contrary to this Protocol").
207. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 13(3).
208. See Protocol supra note 7, art. 14(3) (stating that the inspections must be
made in accordance with Article VII(3) of the Antarctic Treaty).
209. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 16.
210. See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 19(1) (stating that when signing, ratifying,
accepting, approving or acceding to the Protocol, a Party may chose one or both means
for resolution of future disputes). If a Party does not choose a form of dispute resolu-
tion, the Party will be deemed to have chosen the Arbitral Tribunal. Id. art. 19(3).
Parties who have chosen different (or both) means of resolution shall submit their dis-
pute to the Arbitral Tribunal, unless they agree otherwise. Id. art. 19(5).
211. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text (describing the scope of Arti-
cle IV).
212. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 20(2).
213. Protocol, supra note 7, at Schedule to the Protocol: Arbitration, art. 6(1).
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IV. PROTOCOL TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT:
APPLICATION
A. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROTOCOL
The Protocol will enter into force after all the Consultative Parties
have ratified it.214 The Protocol sets forth the means of implementation,
but also allows the individual Parties to promulgate their own imple-
menting legislation. 1 To this end, the United States House of Repre-
sentatives introduced legislation which would implement the
Protocol." 6
B. NECESSITY OF THE PROTOCOL
The October 4, 1991 Protocol is the most comprehensive statement
on the Antarctic Environment to date. Whereas the CCAMLR dealt
with one entire ecosystem,217 the Protocol regulates all life on the
214. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 23. Article 23 provides as follows:
1. This Protocol shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date
of deposit of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession by all
the States which are Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties at the date on which
this Protocol is adopted.
2. For each Contracting Party to the Antarctic Treaty which, subsequent to
the date of entry into force of this Protocol, deposits an instrument of ratifica-
tion, acceptance, approval, or accession, this Protocol shall enter into force on the
thirtieth day following such deposit.
Id. The Protocol instructs the Parties to deposit instruments of ratification with the
United States government. Id. art. 22(3).
215. See Protocol, supra note 7, arts. 11-12 (explaining that the Committee for
Environmental Protection will oversee the Treaty under the authority of the Consulta-
tive Parties); id. art. 13 (setting forth the means by which the Parties will ensure com-
pliance with the Protocol, including adopting appropriate laws and regulations); id. art.
14 (providing for inspection of stations, installations, equipment, ships or aircraft); id.
art. 15 (describing the means by which the Parties can respond to environmental emer-
gencies); id. art. 16 (explaining that the Parties should develop rules and procedures
with respect to liability for environmental damages); id. art. 17 (stating that the Par-
ties must report the actions they have taken to implement the Protocol to the other
Parties and to the Committee for Environmental Protection); id. arts. 18-20 (explain-
ing the dispute resolution procedure); id. arts. 21-23 (describing how and when the
Protocol will enter into force).
216. See Administration Opposes House Bill That Would Implement Antarctica
Treaty, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) (July 2, 1992) (discussing the bill that would estab-
lish the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration as the implementing
agency). The Executive Branch opposes the bill because it would rather have the Na-
tional Science Foundation administering United States activities in Antarctica. Id. The
Administration also opposes the bill because its provisions are more stringent than
those of the Protocol. Id.
217. Supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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Antarctic Continent. 18 Unlike the Agreed Measures,1 9 the Protocol
establishes a means of enforcing its aims, 220 albeit only within the
Antarctic Treaty system.221
1. Inability of the Antarctic Treaty System to Effectively Deal with
Environmental Issues without the Protocol
Without the Protocol there is insufficient regulation of actions which
affect the Antarctic environment. The clearest example of this was the
French effort to build an airstrip at Pointe G~ologie.222 The French
government performed an environmental analysis,a' and construction
began in 1982.224 Although many criticized the French environmental
analysis,225 the government had no obligation to submit its plan to any
international body for approval. 226 Due to extensive protests by environ-
218. See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 2 (declaring the parties' commitment to all
life in Antarctica). Article 2 states that "[t]he Parties commit themselves to the com-
prehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated eco-
systems and hereby designate Antarctica as a natural reserve, devoted to peace and
science." Id.
219. Supra note 122 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 206-13 and accompanying text (explaining that the Protocol
instructs the Parties to prepare implementing laws and regulations). Disputes are heard
by either the Arbitral Tribunal or the International Court of Justice. Id.
221. Protocol, supra note 7, art 5. Article 5 entitled "Consistency with the Other
Components of the Antarctic Treaty System" reads as follows:
The Parties shall consult and co-operate [sic] with the Contracting Parties to
the other international instruments in force within the Antarctic Treaty system
and their respective institutions with a view to ensuring the achievement of the
objectives and principles of this Protocol and avoiding any interference with the
achievement of the objectives and principles of those instruments or any inconsis-
tency between the implementation of those instruments and of this Protocol.
Id.
222. See Barnes, Legal Aspects, supra note 165, at 258 (describing the French
plan). The French government planned to build an airstrip near their base at Pointe
G6ologie. Id. The move was controversial because the station monitored Emperor pen-
guins, the rarest of all penguins, and environmentalists worried that the construction
would jeopardize the penguins' existence. Id. Pointe Gdologie was also recommended as
a site for monitoring the Southern Ocean ecosystem. Id.
223. See Barnes, Legal Aspects, supra note 165, at 258 (stating that the French
National Academy of Science characterized the French environmental analysis as "na-
ive" and inadequate). The French environmental analysis only considered the affects on
fauna in the actual construction zone, and did not evaluate cffects on nearby birds. Id.
224. See Barnes, Legal Aspects, supra note 165, at 258 (stating that the start of
construction was secretive).
225. See supra note 223 and accompanying text (setting forth criticisms of the
analysis).
226. See Barnes, Legal Aspects. supra note 165, at 258 (explaining that France did
not submit its proposal to any international body or to any other country, and that
France did not provide an opportunity for independent scientists or environmentalists to
express views).
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mental groups,227 French authorities temporarily halted construction in
1984228 and set up a committee of experts to reassess the impact of the
airstrip. 29 In the end, the French ignored the recommendation of the
committee and continued construction. 23  Commentators suggest the
French were able to build the airstrip, regardless of environmental ef-
fects, because there were insufficient means of enforcing the Agreed
Measures.231
Had the Protocol been in force when the French proposed construct-
ing the airstrip, they probably would not have built it. Under the Proto-
col, the French government would have had to prepare an Environmen-
tal Impact Statement, 32 and could not have commenced building
without the consent of the Parties. 3 Given the opposition to the air-
strip,234 it is unlikely that the Parties would have approved the plan.
227. See, e.g. UPI, June 29, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File,
Keyword: Penguins (describing the protest of a group of ecologists from Greenpeace
who dressed as penguins to demonstrate the damage being done to the Emperor pen-
guins' breeding and feeding grounds by the construction of the French airstrip); Police,
Protestors Hurt in Demo Over Antarctic Airstrip, Reuters North European Service,
Dec. 6, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File (recounting a Green-
peace effort to stop a French-chartered boat from docking in Tasmania to protest the
destruction of penguin breeding grounds and commenting that tle French suspended
construction pending consideration of a study); Greenpeace Protests Against French
Antarctic Airstrip, Reuters, Feb. 26, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Reuters File (describing a Greenpeace protest at the Dumont d'Urville base in Antarc-
tica); Greenpeace Protestors Clash with French Workers in Antarctic, Reuters, Jan. 9,
1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File (stating that Grcenpeace
staged two incidents at the Dumont d'Urville base in an effort to convince France to
stop the construction); Two Environmentalists Arrested for Antarctic Ship Stowaway,
Reuters, Feb. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File (detailing the
stowaway of two environmentalists on a French Antarctic supply ship in protest of the
airstrip construction).
228. Barnes, Legal Aspects, supra note 165, at 259.
229. See Barnes, Legal Aspects, supra note 165, at 259 (stating that the team of
experts unanimously requested that a new environmental impact statement be prepared
by a multinational group of scientists).
230. See Barnes, Legal Aspects, supra note 165, at 259 (explaining that the con-
struction continued even though ASOC circulated a briefing paper and an analysis of
possible violations of the Treaty to the Consultative Parties and to the United Nations);
see also Greenpeace Protestors Clash with French Workers in Antarctic, Reuters, Jan.
9, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File (stating that the airstrip is
scheduled to be completed in 1992).
231. See VICUPA, ANTARCTIC MINERAL EXPLOITATION, supra note 100 at 279 (as-
serting that although the Parties have promulgated measures which bind them, there
are insufficient means of enforcement).
232. See supra notes 198-204 and accompanying text (setting forth the procedures
for preparing an Environmental Impact Assessment).
233. See Annex I, supra note 198, arts. 3-4 (explaining that the Parties base their
decisions upon the Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation prepared by the Party
wishing to act).
234. See Barnes, Legal Aspects, supra note 165, at 259 (stating that both Austra-
lia and New Zealand asked France for more information about the consequences of the
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Another example of the inability of the pre-Protocol system to effec-
tively regulate the environment is the shipwreck of an Argentinean sup-
ply ship in 1989.235 As the ship sank, it released thousands of gallons of
oil into Antarctic waters, jeopardizing the nearby ecosystems.236 Under
the Protocol, the Parties would have been able to assess liability and
damages against Argentina for harming the Antarctic environment.
23 7
2. Ineffectiveness of Using Domestic Legislation to Protect the
Antarctic Environment
Heretofore, the United States has been a leader in environmental
law, and other countries have yet to exceed the standard set by the
United States regarding extraterritorial 23s application of environmental
legislation. 239 Whether Antarctica is considered a foreign country,
thereby requiring extraterritorial treatment, is somewhat unclear. 40
United States case law has indicated that the United States will not
enforce its environmental laws extraterritorially unless there is a clear
construction after the reports were circulated). see also Cousteau Calls on France to
Stop Building Airstrip in Antarctic, Reuters, Apr. 18, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Reuters File (referring to oceanographer Jacques Cousteau's appeal to
the French government to halt construction on the airstrip to preserve the delicate eco-
logical balance); Greenpeace Accuses Australia Over French Antarctic Airstrip,
Reuters North European Service, Oct. 15, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Reuters File (explaining that the Australian Foreign Ministry in Canberra recom-
mended that a French request for specialized equipment to be used in the airstrip con-
struction be denied).
235. See Bruce C. Manheim, Antarctica: The Fragile Last Frontier, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 23, 1989, at 19 (describing the shipwreck of the Argentinean
ship, the Bahia Parasio, as the worst environmental disaster to ever occur in
Antarctica).
236. See id. (explaining that the spill would endanger the existence of seals, pen-
guins, and seabirds).
237. See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 16 (stating that the Parties may elaborate
rules and procedures consistent with the objectives of the Protocol).
238. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 588 (6th ed. 1990) (defining extraterritorial-
ity). "Extraterritoriality" is defined as "[the] operation [of laws] upon persons, rights,
or jural relations, existing beyond the limits of the enacting state or nation, but still
amenable to its laws." Id.
239. See generally, Recent Developments, Extraterritorial Environmental Regula-
tion, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1609, 1617-39 (1991) (explaining that the extraterritorial
practices of the United States are followed by most nations, therefore there is little
extraterritorial application of environmental law).
240. See Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 93-94 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding
that because Antarctica is not subject to the sovereignty of any foreign state, it cannot
be considered a foreign country); contra Smith v. United States, 932 F.2d 791, 792
(9th Cir. 1991) (disagreeing with Beattie and holding that Antarctica is a foreign
country).
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legislative intent to do so. 241 In fact, a recent case, Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Massey,2 42 held that the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) did not apply to Antarctica.243 The United States House
of Representatives has proposed legislation which would implement the
Protocol,244 but because the Bush administration is opposed to the bill,
it is unlikely to become law, let alone be enforced extraterritorially. 2"4
There is little to suggest that other countries would be more willing to
apply their environmental laws to Antarctica than the United States
has been,246 so attention once again turns to the enforceability of the
measures within the Antarctic Treaty system, namely the Protocol.
C. ENFORCEABILITY OF THE PROTOCOL
The chief problems with the Protocol are those that have plagued
earlier measures: sovereignty and enforceability. The Protocol explicitly
exempts the issue of sovereignty from matters which the Arbitral Tri-
bunal may decide.247 Once again, the Parties have agreed to disa-
gree.248 Earlier efforts within the Antarctic Treaty System to protect
the Antarctic environment have been binding on the Parties, but be-
cause there are insufficient means of enforcement, they have been
ineffective.249
241. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., Ill
S.Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991) (holding that absent clearly expressed legislative intent, legis-
lation is presumed to apply only within the United States); Defenders of Wildlife v.
Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that the Endangered Species Act does
not apply outside the United States because there is no explicit extraterritorial
provision).
242. Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1991).
243. See id. (holding that NEPA does not contain a clear expression of extraterri-
toriality and therefore does not extend to Antarctica). The Environmental Defense
Fund (EDF) sought to enjoin the National Science Foundation (NSF) from incinerat-
ing garbage at McMurdo Station in Antarctica. Id. at 1297.
244. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (explaining that the proposed leg-
islation contains provisions which are more stringent than the Protocol).
245. Supra note 216 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g. VICURA, ANTARCTIC MINERAL EXPLOITATION, supra note 100, at
280 (stating that extraterritorial application of British law would require specific legis-
lative authority, of which there is currently no indication); Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA)
(July 31, 1991) (stating that Argentina currently has no broad, standard-setting
legislation).
247. Supra note 211 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 137, 151-52 and accompanying text (explaining that the pre-
vious agreements regarding the Antarctic environment have refused to resolve the sov-
ereignty issue, but rather have maintained a somewhat uneasy compromise by making
the topic a non-issue).
249. See VICUPA, ANTARCTIC MINERAL EXPLOITATION, supra note 100, at 279-80




The problem of enforceability25 is one which none of the Antarctic
environmental measures have fully resolved.2" 1 The Protocol is unlikely
to be any more successful. The Protocol provides for the establishment
of enforcement measures,2 52 but because they will operate within the
Antarctic Treaty System, there will be insufficient administrative sup-
port to ensure compliance.253
It is unlikely that third parties will be bound by the Protocol 2" be-
cause there is little indication that the Protocol was intended to reach
non-parties. 5 5 If it is not possible to enforce the provisions of the Pro-
tocol against third parties, the Protocol will be unable to fulfill its
stated purpose of protecting the Antarctic environment.2 " Third par-
ties will be able to begin or continue activities which have adverse envi-
ronmental impact without fear of liability.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the documents which make up the
Antarctic Treaty System, including the Protocol, bind third parties
under either customary international law257 or the objective treaty the-
250. See supra notes 141, 155-56 and accompanying text (explaining that it is un-
likely that third parties are bound by the Antarctic Treaty System). Within the
Antarctic Treaty System, the likelihood that a Party will report another's environmen-
tal infractions is slight, because to this time no Party has reported against another.
MYHRE, supra note 30, at 126.
251. See supra notes 141, 155-56 and accompanying text (explaining why the en-
forcement measures under the CCAMLR and the CRAMRA are insufficient).
252. See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 13 (stating that the Parties shall take appro-
priate measures to ensure compliance with the goals of the Protocol).
253. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text (explaining that the Parties'
reluctance to set up any type of administrative system has resulted in an inability to
enforce the measures which make up the Antarctic Treaty system). See also NSF
Hopes Antarctica Waste Disposal Rule Will Become Effective By March 1993. Int'l
Envtl. Daily (BNA) (July 9, 1992) (reporting that although the United States supports
a permanent secretariat, Argentina opposes the idea due to cost).
254. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text (discussing how third parties
may be bound by treaties).
255. See Protocol, supra note 7, art. 6 (setting forth the obligations of the Parties
with regard to the protection of the environment, but not mentioning the role of non-
parties); id. art. 8 (discussing how the Parties should assess the environmental impact
of their activities, but not stating that non-parties are obliged to prepare Environmental
Impact Assessments); but see id. art. 13(5) (stating the Consultative Meetings shall
make any non-party State aware of any of its activities that affect the implementation
of the purposes of the Protocol).
256. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 3. The Protocol instructs the Parties to inform
non-Party states if their actions do not comply with the principles and objectives of the
Protocol. Id. art. 13(5). It does not, however, specifically include non-Parties in the
dispute resolution process. Id. arts. 18-20.
257. See TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 43, at 147-50 (considering the
argument that Article IV creates a customary norm, and rejecting the contention be-
cause States generally do not recognize the validity of Antarctic claims).
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ory,258 it is still unlikely that the Protocol could be enforced. Thus, the
Protocol leaves Antarctica in essentially the same vulnerable position as
the earlier measures did. The Antarctic Treaty system has promulgated
worthy environmental legislation that cannot be enforced given the in-
adequacies of the system.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Antarctic Treaty system has successfully maintained the status
quo for over thirty years.2 59 Given its loose construction, 60 however, it
has been unable to respond to the growing need to protect the
Antarctic environment. 61 Accordingly, it is necessary to restructure
the administration of Antarctica.
Currently, environmental treaties are viewed as ineffective because
they lack enforcement mechanisms." 2 In order for the new Antarctic
administration to be effective, it must create a system in which rules
concerning the environment can be enforced. The first hurdle to over-
come is the sovereignty issue. This can be achieved by establishing a
condominium regime.26 3 A condominium regime is feasible because it
does not require any of the claimant states to relinquish their rights,264
but rather to pool them with the other nations. Although this system
would resolve the sovereignty issue, it would still require an authorita-
tive entity.
26 5
In light of the increased role of the United Nations in world politics
following the Persian Gulf war, 266 it seems a natural choice. The Gen-
258. See TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 43, at 140-47 (describing how
the objective theory of treaties makes it possible to apply treaty provisions to third
parties, but concluding that the Treaty, by itself, does not create an objective regime).
259. See Willy )streng, The Conflict and Alignment Pattern of Antarctic Politics:
Is a New Order Needed?, in THE ANTARCTIC SYSTEM IN WORLD POLITICS 433, 433
(Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl & Willy Pstreng eds., 1991) (observing that the Antarctic
Treaty system has maintained peace, stability, and scientific cooperation in
Antarctica).
260. Supra notes 114-18.
261. See supra notes 3 & 10 and accompanying text (describing the increased real-
ization that Antarctica is environmentally crucial to both its own ecosystems and to the
Earth as a whole).
262. See Ronald A. Taylor, U.N. Pact is a Spur, Not a Law, WASH. TIMES, May
24, 1992 at A6 (remarking that one of the few effective methods of enforcing environ-
mental agreements is moral duty).
263. See BLAY, ANTARCTICA AFTER 1991, supra note 3, at 14 (stating that under a
condominium regime, the Parties would pool their rights and interests). The rights to
Antarctica would be shared equally between claimants and non-claimants. Id.
264. See supra note 70 (defining the term "multiple condominium").
265. Supra note 70.




eral Assembly would likely support this selection given its earlier en-
thusiasm over the World Park concept. 61 Antarctica could be adminis-
tered by the United Nations Commission on Environment and
Development (UNCED), which likely will play a larger geopolitical
role following the June 1992 UNCED Conference. Antarctica would
thus be turned over to a group which is concerned about its environ-
ment and would receive the benefits of a pre-existing administrative
structure. The claimant nations, although required to pool their claims,
would not surrender their interests to any one nation, but rather, main-
tain an interest which is shared by the global community.
CONCLUSION
The Protocol is an excellent example of environmental policy, but
nevertheless has weaknesses in the areas of sovereignty and enforceabil-
ity.268 For the first time, a piece of environmental regulation promul-
gated within the Antarctic Treaty has established a working adminis-
trative body to ensure that its policies are followed.2 69 The Protocol
establishes an elaborate system to assure that no new environmentally
harmful activities will take place on the continent. Unfortunately, it is
unlikely that any of these policies will ever be enforced because they
were crafted in a system which refuses to establish any type of admin-
istrative control. Therefore, it is necessary to refurbish the Antarctic
system by entrusting its management to the United Nations.
267. Supra note 161 and accompanying text.
268. Supra notes 245-56 and accompanying text.
269. Supra notes 195-97.
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